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The market, economic growth and famine in the medieval English countryside in the 
early fourteenth century
1
 
Phillipp Schofield, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK (prs@aber.ac.uk)  
 
Bruce Campbell has recently noted that key measures of economic wellbeing, notably real 
wages and GDP suggest that early fourteenth-century England was, relative to other western 
European economies, able to sustain its economy and did not experience the significant fall 
experienced by the altogether wealthier economies of Italy, Spain and Flanders. Campbell 
notes that ‘the relative stability of both real wages and per capita GDP independently 
estimated indicate that, short-term crises apart, [England] was not becoming significantly 
poorer’.2 Campbell has suggested that England was able to avoid the kind of economic 
downturn experienced by Flanders and Italy because its levels of engagement in international 
trade were far less; instead, the English economy was buoyed both by a plentiful (indeed 
over-plentiful) supply of labour and an internally-driven economy largely engaged in the 
production of raw rather than finished product.
3
 Campbell does not, however, examine the 
short-term crises per se or their consequences for this pattern. It is though implicit in what he 
says that the famines of the early fourteenth century can have had no significant longer term 
impact on this general stability.  
In what follows, I would like to test this premise and to explore the possibility that a 
famine of such magnitude had relatively little impact on the general pattern of English 
economic performance in this period. In doing so, I will concentrate on the market in the 
medieval English economy and consider evidence for its durability even during the worst of 
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the crisis years of the early fourteenth century; it is suggested in what follows that the 
persistence of marketing structures throughout the Great Famine years permitted the 
continuance of the kinds of trading activities described by Campbell. The main focus of the 
discussion will be upon the agrarian economy, the central component of the English economy 
in this period,
4
 and opportunity will be taken to reflect upon and, in certain instances, to 
challenge recent work in this area. 
To what extent can we detect adjustments in the behaviour of some of the main 
features of the early fourteenth-century English agrarian economy? Since Ian Kershaw’s 
major contribution to the study of the Great Famine of the early fourteenth century, there has 
been relatively little comment on the ways in which the harvest failures in the second decade 
of the fourteenth century affected the behaviour of the agrarian economy.
5
  Kershaw turned to 
the Great Famine in order to engage with a debate current in the 1960s and 1970s regarding 
the identification of a turning point in the medieval English agrarian economy. This was, 
inevitably, led by M.M. Postan who, in constructing a model of long-term economic change 
for England in the Middle Ages, had proposed that a decline in resources, greatly encouraged 
by harvest failure, reduced population and thereby slowed the medieval economy in the 
decades before the arrival of plague in the mid-fourteenth century. As Kershaw notes, more 
than one historian writing in the 1960s and early 1970s disputed Postan’s interpretation and 
marshalled evidence to show continued growth and investment.
6
 This was characterised 
especially by an exchange between Postan and Barbara Harvey, the latter arguing that a 
review of the available evidence, notably that relating to a retreat from marginal land as 
evidence of a contraction of population and a reduced demand on all available resources, 
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 I. Kershaw, The great famine and agrarian crisis in England 1315-1322,  ” Past and Present” 59 
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suggested that identification of a resources crisis and a significant downturn in the medieval 
economy in the first years of the fourteenth century was overstated.
7
 Returning to this theme 
almost a quarter century later and in the historiographical context of a renewed emphasis 
upon the importance of the market, Harvey questioned the significance of the crisis as an 
event that shifted the medieval economy so far from its axis that it failed to recover. 
Concluding that the mid-fourteenth century plague was likely to have been the change of 
seismic proportions she suggested that, rather than effecting a major adjustment to the 
economy, the crisis of the early fourteenth-century was a ‘mid-term crisis’, someway short of 
a ‘turning-point of secular significance’.8 
By most available indices the Great Famine was a crisis of dramatic proportions and, 
as Harvey has commented, more than a mere ‘fluctuation’. While population and mortality 
estimates for high and later medieval England are far from robust, it has been suggested that 
10 per cent of a population somewhere in the region of 5 million succumbed to famine in the 
first and worst years of the crisis, between 1315 and 1317.
9
 Contemporaries were in no doubt 
as to the magnitude of the crisis, chroniclers describing the dreadful experiences of the poor 
and vulnerable, the spread of disease in the wake of shortage and the consequent disruption to 
the general population. They write also of the heightened grain prices and identify severe 
fluctuations in price not only as a cause of the subsequent morbidity and mortality but also as 
a key index of the intense disruption itself.
10
 In his discussion of the Great Famine, Kershaw 
was also struck by the severe short-to-medium term consequences of economic disruption 
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occasioned by both the harvest failure and the associated diseases and murrains. He detects 
and describes a series of evident catastrophes in terms of production. In particular, he notes 
the following significant indices of crisis and economic change: crop failure and extremely 
high grain prices; a decline in livestock numbers and associated product, especially wool; 
other product failures, apparently occasioned by changed environmental conditions, such as a 
decline in the availability of salt; and a disruption to other features of economic dealing, 
notably changes in the pattern of land transfer. He also describes some evidence for the 
demographic consequences and also sets out evidence for a downturn. We can examine each 
of these elements, briefly, noting more of the details identified by Kershaw while also adding 
comment and evidence from more recent work on this area.  
In the first place, and perhaps most obviously, grain production underwent a severe 
decline on many estates and manors.
11
A number of other historians have also noted the 
dramatic volatility of grain price movements in this period and have also described the 
marked hike in grain prices, especially in 1315-16.
12
 As contemporaries also recorded, prices 
rose to very high levels, reaching their peak in the late winter and spring of 1316.
13
 
Undoubtedly, this reflects in the first instance, poor yield. Evidence chiefly issuing from 
ecclesiastical estates, such as the bishopric of Winchester, indicates a widespread failing of 
yield, no doubt exacerbated by the general poverty of yield even in reasonably good harvest 
years. Most of the main grains on most manors declined in yield by more than 20 per cent in 
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 Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 99-101. 
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 J.E.T.  Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England (Oxford, 7 volumes, 1866-1902), i., 
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1315 and 1316, as Kershaw illustrates.
14
 Livestock production also underwent similarly 
significant but also variable declines. Kershaw notes a decline in sheep and cattle stocks and 
this is a theme that has been taken up most recently by Philip Slavin who argues strongly for 
a dramatic decline in livestock numbers in the years immediately following the poor harvests 
of 1315-17, a decline from which recovery took decades.
15
 Related to the last point, of 
course, wool production also underwent a severe decline in the period of the famine and the 
associated livestock murrains, which persisted into the early 1320s. While the pattern is far 
from consistent, sheep flocks were decimated across wide swathes of the country and it 
seems only to have been in the south-east of the country that they held their numbers. Wool 
export figures generally suggest a significant slump between c.1315 and c.1325 with exports 
from London and Southampton seemingly alone in behaving in a manner contrary to that 
general trend.
16
 
In terms of labour, England on the eve of the Great Famine was almost certainly 
heavily, indeed over-, populated relative to its available resources, with an associated over-
supply of labour. This, as we have briefly discussed earlier, was at the heart of Postan’s 
explanation for change in the medieval economy, an over-populated country outstripping its 
resources and leading to economic decline followed by a further stage of regrowth. Others, as 
we have also seen, have attempted to suggest that evidence for population’s decline has been 
over-stated.
17
 There is in fact only limited direct indication of population decline with 
consequences for the labour force and no suggestion in the wage data or other associated 
                                                          
14
 Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 99-101.  
15
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responses that any significant decline in population diminished the labour supply.
18
 Gregory 
Clark has in fact suggested that the first year of the Great Famine was, in terms of labouring, 
the single worst year for wage labourers in recorded English wage history.
19
 While Clark 
does detect some upward movement in wages paid even in the worst harvest years, reflective 
he suggests of a flexible labour market capable of adjusting to sudden falls in available 
labour, he also comments that agrarian wage labour in the early fourteenth century was at an 
historical low-point, the years 1310-23 witnessing six of the seven worst years for real wages 
in recorded history, 1296 being the seventh.
20
 In other words, he suggests that the wage data 
indicate population decline as well as an incapacity for wages to come close to the dramatic 
price surges of these years. The little available data that allows mortality estimates does 
indicate that population underwent a sudden decline in the famine years, a combination both 
of shortage and associated epidemic diseases.
21
 The heightened mortality may, as Kershaw 
has suggested, have been especially prevalent amongst the relatively poor and the most 
vulnerable, a group that included the poorer landless and sub-tenants; it this group who were 
also likely to have made up an important element of the waged-labourers of the medieval 
English countryside.
22
 Tithing-penny payments (essentially owed by almost all males over 
the age of twelve within a village) extracted from manorial court rolls also suggest that, when 
set against death-duty (heriot) payments made by the more substantial members of the 
peasant tenantry, tenant deaths occurred at a lower rate than that operating for the wider adult 
male population. Shortages in the countryside and the combined disaster of disease following 
in the wake of famine almost certainly also encouraged a flood of migrants, with some 
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indication that urban populations grew as rural migrants headed into towns looking for 
succour.
23
 
There was also some disruption and unusual volatility in land transfer, including 
peaks of transfers in the worst of the harvest years.
24
 There has been a great deal of work on 
the early fourteenth-century land market since the appearance of Kershaw’s article and more 
than one historian has noted the plentiful evidence for short-term disruption and a break of 
more typical economic patterns in the worst of the harvest years. The patterns described by 
Kershaw and, decades earlier, by William Hudson for the Norfolk manor of Hindolveston, 
have been, generally speaking, identified in other court roll series.
25
 This has been studied 
with particular reference to the market in unfree or customary land as recorded in manorial 
courts. Thus, for instance, Richard Smith has described a dramatic increase in the velocity of 
inter-vivos transfers on the Suffolk manor of Redgrave, with a near doubling of transfers in 
an already busy market in the first of the Great Famine years; Campbell’s study of the 
Norfolk manor of Coltishall also illustrates the same peaking of land transfers in the worst 
harvest years or in their immediate aftermath. Schofield has examined similar patterns for 
another Suffolk manor, Hinderclay, and has considered the underlying dynamic of such 
transfers. Margaret Yates has also identified considerable fluctuation in the market in free 
land in this period, as recorded in so-called ‘feets of fine’.26 
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To what extent did such disruption in the short-term cause sustained and longer-term 
damage to the English agrarian economy? Kershaw was rather equivocal in assessing the 
main ambition of his argument, namely the longer-term impact of the crisis upon the 
economy. Rather like Barbara Harvey, whose views were summarised earlier, he was not 
inclined to identify in the Great Famine and the agrarian crisis of the early fourteenth century 
a turning point of a fundamental kind. Kershaw did detect some longer-term impact of the 
famine and noted in particular a regional dimension to this, with areas that were already 
poorer populated and generally less resilient tending, unsurprisingly, to bear the brunt of the 
crisis; while, in such regions, the crisis of the early fourteenth century can be identified as a 
turning point, ending for instance the kinds of estate management lords had been able to 
maintain during the previous century, in other parts of the country, the agrarian economy 
coped, and sometimes coped well.
27
 There is though no doubt that features of the crisis 
persisted for decades, not least the decimation inflicted upon livestock numbers which, it has 
recently been suggested, hardly managed to recover fully.
28
  
Others have more recently attempted to suggest that the famine years introduced a 
pathological weakness into the early fourteenth-century population which was still in 
evidence a generation later.
29
 Slavin also suggests that protein deficiency arising from the 
severe livestock epidemic in the years either side of 1320 also added to the sufferings 
endured by the population in the early fourteenth century and helps explain a failure of 
population to recover, or rather the creation of a persistent vulnerability within the 
population.
30
 This stands in some contrast to what we know of post-famine populations in the 
early modern period, and in particular England where, as Ronald Lee, has discussed there is 
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strong evidence for a relatively short-term impact upon fertility and mortality arising from 
heightened grain prices but with the consequence that ‘the effect of high prices was primarily 
to advance by a few years of the week, who would in any case have died soon, rather than to 
strike down those who would have otherwise lived many years more’.31 
* 
We should not necessarily assume however that volatility of prices, and the other indices 
outlined above, signalled a significant and fundamental downturn in economic performance. 
Recently Philip Slavin has sought to suggest that the extreme price behaviour during the 
period of the Great Famine revealed a fundamental weakness in the performance of the 
English economy and illustrated its intense vulnerability. Identifying a series of indices of 
market failure, Slavin suggests that the early fourteenth century showed evidence of failure in 
four key respects, namely aggressive short-term price movement, price segregation, grain 
hoarding, and the collapse of a just price for products. For instance, he detects what he deems 
to be the emergence of a preferential trade in grain, through which ‘insiders’ managed to 
profit and often at the expense of those operating outside systems of local knowledge or 
privilege. While Slavin may be correct to suggest that ‘this situation reflects the collapse of 
generalized trust and a switch to a much more particularized sort of trust’32, and in short to 
see the period as one characterised by market failure in that the market served to help 
aggravate the crisis, it is possible to interpret these developments rather differently.  In the 
following section I wish to set out some evidence for a refocussing of the market upon those 
with the kinds of market strengths, including surpluses of capital and particular regional 
advantages, that allowed them to make best use of the market and its conventions during this 
period of remarkable volatility. This is not to argue that the market worked to the general 
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advantage of the population in the early fourteenth century and during crisis years; it almost 
certainly did not, as previous discussion of, most obviously, the peasant land market, has 
sought to show.
33
 While a particularised market undoubtedly led to great and, in some cases, 
fatal vulnerabilities for those who were not well-placed to benefit from the crisis, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that those who might we deem, in some form or another, to have been 
amongst the wealthiest in the early fourteenth century society and economy were able to use 
pre-existing mechanisms in order to steer a secure course through the famine and to emerge 
not only relatively unscathed but also stronger and better placed. In this sense, the Great 
Famine’s consequences for economic growth may appear rather muted and the functioning of 
markets sustained and, conceivably, reinforced. In this final section, we can return to some of 
the above indices of disruption and consider them in terms of their evidence for the 
persistence and durability of the market, even in periods of such evident economic and 
environmental crisis. With these issues in mind and in reviewing evidence for market strength 
during the Great Famine, we can examine the following related points: (i) grain price 
movements; (ii) land transfer; (iii) dealing in credit  
 
(i) Grain price movement as an index of market strength 
Cormac O’Grada, reflecting upon the relationship between markets and famine in pre-
industrial Europe, has suggested that early modern markets continued to function effectively 
even in the more difficult harvest years.
34
 Citing evidence from famines in France in the reign 
of Louis XIV and the two nineteenth-century great famines in Ireland and Finland 
respectively, O’Grada suggests that markets in all contexts continued to function reasonably 
normally. He argues that a key measures of this continued function, the law of single price, 
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illustrates that while, in all instances, prices rose beyond the ‘equilibrium value’, the market 
through its function prevented significant movement away from the ‘equilibrium price’, in 
other words that there was little evidence of sharp distinctions between sub-regions within 
national contexts and that pairs of markets tend to follow the same price movements with a 
speedy adjustment in price. This stands in some contrast to market behaviour in developing 
countries in later twentieth-century famines, as O’Grada also notes.35 
The limited study to date of regional markets and their integration in medieval 
England suggests that markets were, rather as those discussed by O’Grada for pre-industrial 
Europe, reasonably well-integrated at the time of the Great Famine. Jim Galloway has offered 
the most recent assessment of this integration and, while he is more circumspect in his 
analysis than was Gregory Clark in a slightly earlier discussion of the same theme, he does 
challenge the much earlier position, proposed by N.S.B. Gras, that grain marketing was 
closely regionalised.
36
 He argues that, while not conclusive, there is good evidence for 
effective integration of grain markets in the early fourteenth century and suggests that price 
integration may have been especially secure where good, and typically water-borne, trading 
links operated between regions. It has also long been evident that grain yields did not fail 
universally, either inter- or intra-regionally. Kershaw had discussed the persistence of yields 
on particular manors even in the context of significantly declining yields on neighbouring 
manors; even subtle differences in topography and growing conditions could influence yields 
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upwards or downwards by considerable margins, especially when the mean yield was in any 
case low.
37
 Between regions these differences were often accentuated and may have also 
helped, in the longer term, to serve to identify certain manors, estates and sub-regions as 
especially suited or not to grain production.  
Most importantly here, we are certainly aware of movement of grain between regions in the 
famine years. Kershaw notes that merchants scoured the country in the worst years of the 
famine looking for opportunities to trade grain at profit.
38
 More recently Buchanan Sharp, as 
part of an examination of the ways in which Edward II’s government sought to deal with the 
famine conditions, has set out the various injunctions regarding the movement of grain and, 
most especially, careful control of its export.
39
 Sharp’s discussion of this attempt to regulate 
grain movement makes it clear that the Edwardian government recognised the capacity of a 
market in grain to operate inter-regionally and that the crisis helped generate the kinds of 
regulatory and controlling mechanisms which, to some degree, helped facilitate the 
movement of grain. Such mechanisms, such as letters of protection and safe conduct, must 
have served well those eager to engage in substantial movement of grain in this period. While 
in terms of overall supply, the total amount of grain must, as we have already seen and as is 
strongly suggested by both yield and price data, have declined in the worst harvest years, 
velocity of transfers also intensified and the distribution of resources and polarisation of 
capital was increased.  
In this respect we can argue that the market, in its fairly rudimentary state, worked too 
efficiently rather than that it failed. Take for instance the seasonal sale of grain, with evidence 
for post-harvest increases in grain price. As a number of historians have described, an upward 
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trend in grain prices in the months after the harvest was a pattern repeated on a number of 
seigneurial estates and has sometimes been identified as a deliberate policy of price control 
and maximisation. David Stone has illustrated the capacity of reeves to maximise market 
conditions to their best advantageous and to massage good prices out of grain sales in all 
years; Philip Slavin has also suggested that lords and their officers may have attempted to 
manipulate grain sales to their advantage in crisis years though, as he acknowledges his 
methodology in employing the available data, leaves his conclusions rather uncertain.
40
 It 
has, though, on occasion been assumed that demesne officials and those with grain reserves 
sought to retain them in harvest years in order to take maximum benefit from the straitened 
market conditions, hoarding identified as evidence of a weak and poorly regulated market.
41
 
However, as O’Grada has discussed in responding to, inter alia, earlier work by McCloskey 
and Nash, price movements suggestive of extreme hikes in the late winter and spring of the 
year following the poor harvest are not at all consistent with grain hoarding or, by extension, 
fundamentally inefficient markets. O’Grada suggests that a pattern of grain price movements 
consistent with hoarded grain would show early peaks in price, in the autumn following the 
harvest as grain was hoarded in the wake of the poor harvest; the price would not then rise 
significantly until the end of the season or, to quote O’Grada, ‘hoarding during famines, in 
other words, implies smaller increases than usual from seasonal trough to peak’; by contrast, 
again to follow O’Grada, a grain market in which hoarding was not taking place would show 
price rises consistent with general patterns but in greater proportion. Allowing for the ‘noise’ 
of grain already stored from the previous year’s harvest, prices, where hoarding was not 
taking place to any significant degree, would have risen throughout the season. This appears 
to be a pattern also described by Gregory Clark in his discussion of grain price movements 
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and the behaviour of markets in pre-industrial England, noting also a tendency for grain 
prices to rise across the post-harvest season.
42
 In other words, prices rose across the post-
harvest season because of shortage but the pattern of their rise does not indicate that the 
market itself had in all respects failed, but rather that it had adjusted to the prevailing 
conditions. 
(ii) Land transfer as an index of market strength 
As we have already seen, more than one historian of the medieval land market has noted, the 
first of the Great Famine years prompted a significant rise in land transfers. While there has 
sometimes been a tendency to see sales of land in this period as chiefly an index of distress, 
the sale occasioned by the needs of the seller, it is also evident that wealthier villagers used 
the opportunity of a heightened willingness to sell in order to profit from a market in land. 
Kershaw noted a tendency for accumulation of landholding in the hands of those apparently 
with greater capital resources.
43
 Smith has also set out the buyer:seller ratios for the 
customary land market at Redgrave and has noted similar features; while the ratio of buyers 
to sellers is not always especially marked, the general indication, especially when intra-
familial transfers of land are discounted, is that the number of sellers in inter-familial 
transfers of property tended to exceed that of sellers.
44
 While Smith has also noted that such 
accumulations did not persist for many years, and could be reallocated through inter-vivos 
transfer after a relatively short period of time, there is clear indication that the early 
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 Clark, Markets and Economic Growth; for an example of this fairly steady pattern of rise in the 
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 Smith, op. cit., pp. 160-5; also Schofield, Social economy, pp. 52-3 for similar and the observation, 
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fourteenth-century land market, stimulated by crisis, effected a redistribution of land 
holding.
45
 While it is certainly the case that such a redistribution worked to the general 
advantage of the relatively wealthy, it is also evident that distress sales supported, in some 
but certainly not all instances, poorer peasants in their struggle to survive the Great Famine. It 
was the capacity of the land market to absorb sales and to release capital that is especially 
relevant in this respect and, with this in mind, further micro-historical research is needed 
upon the survival experience of those who shed landholding in the worst of the famine years.  
In terms of market capacity and inter-vivos transfer during crisis years, Yates also notes 
that, in her discussion of the accelerated transfer of freeholdings in the famine years, that the 
mechanism for facilitating transfer held up well in these years and that ‘the sums paid as 
consideration’ remained reasonably constant, features she associates with a market able to 
cope with the crisis.
46
 It may also be noted that for some lords an increased volatility in the 
land market worked to their advantage in generating an increased income from entry fines 
associated with the transfer of holdings; Smith again has noted how on the manor of 
Redgrave the land market in small customary holdings generated significant amounts of 
annual income for the lord of the manor, the abbot of Bury St Edmunds. In particular, he 
identifies seigneurial income from the land market in the worst of the harvest years as 
capable, through accelerated inter-vivos transfers, of generating income in excess of the 
annual rental value of the customary landholding on the manor.
47
 
 
(iii) Credit as an index of market strength 
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 Smith, op. cit., pp. 165-76. Such a pattern of behaviour is also generally consistent with the view 
that the land market, while significant in this period but with a tendency, even subsequent to limited 
accumlation, to morcellation, did not at this point in the economic history of England encourage 
economic growth; see, for instance, B.M.S. Campbell, Land markets and the morcellation of holdings 
in pre-plague England and pre-famine Ireland, in: Property rights, land markets and economic 
growth in the European countryside (thirteenth-twentieth centuries), ed. by G. Béaur, P.R. Schofield, 
J-M Chevet and M. Teresa Pérez Picazo, Turnhout 2013, pp. 197-218. 
46
 Yates, op. cit., p. 584. 
47
 Smith, op. cit., pp. 158-9. 
16 
 
 
There is little indication that low-level sales of land in this period reflected a failure of credit 
agreements or that land was typically used as security against credit agreements in this 
period. However, as with land transfer and price movements, there are also tell-tale signs of 
movement in the frequency of activity associated with credit agreements in the worst harvest 
years. Most credit agreements were extended by oral contract and we cannot gain a clear 
view of the extent or frequency of credit as extended. Instead, most credit comes to our notice 
in the form of failed credit agreements and through litigation aimed at the recovery of debts. 
As with the other indices identified above, it has been tempting for historians to view failed 
credit as an indication of market weakness, loss of confidence on the part of lenders 
precipitating a rush to recover from debtors. As we have discussed earlier, it is reasonable to 
suppose that recovery of debt in such a context did occur in the worst harvest years. 
However, we should not necessarily see this as the defining context for debt recovery in the 
Great Famine years.  
In particular, an examination of debt recoveries in the worst harvest years of the 
fourteenth-century suggests that a significant amount of the capital (money, goods or labour) 
in credit agreements was tied up in credit agreements which were characterised both by single 
large agreements and creditor-plaintiffs operating at a relatively elevated socio-economic 
level than were the debtor-defendants. In a recent paper, Schofield has challenged the notions 
that most credit at the village level was extended in small transactions and was intended for 
consumption rather than investment. While it is evidently the case that most credit 
agreements did indeed involve small sums of money or goods, it is also clear, from manorial 
court litigation data available to date, that most of the available capital, in terms of that 
subjected to litigation for recovery, was included in relatively large transactions. Take for 
instance, recovery of debts on the abbey of Bury St Edmunds’ manor at Great Barton 
17 
 
(Suffolk), where in 1316-17, during the first year of the Great Famine, one individual, 
possibly a local grain factor from beyond the manor, was plaintiff in 87 per cent of the total 
capital pursued (84s. worth of various grains, out of the total sum of 96s. 6d. in terms capital 
pursued).
48
 Replication of this pattern in other instances and related indications of mercantile 
involvement in the grain trade and larger credit agreements at the village level suggest a 
degree of competitive engagement that again argues against the view that markets failed to 
function in this period. Analysis of these suggests that those with relative surpluses of capital 
were able to function with a degree of continued confidence during the worst of the famine 
years. Thus, for instance, we are aware of credit contracts that extended over the period of the 
Great Famine without forced recovery during this same period. 
** 
The behaviour of prices and associated economic activity in the worst years of the Great 
Famine in England suggests that marketing structures in England were, by the early 
fourteenth century, sufficiently robust that they did not fail in crisis years. None of this is to 
contend that the Great Famine was not a potentially devastating event; there is plentiful 
evidence to suggest that it was. Rather we should see the continuity of marketing structures as 
robust and secure in so far as they supported and sustained those best placed to exploit them. 
So, for instance, merchant traders in grain, wealthy creditors with surplus capital, lords with 
effectively operating demesnes, were all well-placed not only to cope with the harvest 
shortfalls but also, in some instances, to benefit from them. In this respect, the market had its 
own life and vitality, managed by those who had good reason to see it thrive. This relative 
advantage was also evident on a regional basis as, for instance, described by Mate for south 
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eastern England who, while acknowledging the signs of significant disruption, is at most 
pains to make it clear that producers in the south-eastern counties of Sussex and Kent 
generally coped well during the famine years and vicissitudes of the early fourteenth century; 
according to Mate, the especially vulnerable were those whose particular circumstances 
combined against them (‘families with tiny holdings in oat-growing areas’, for instance).49 
This last point reminds us that what the market was not calibrated to achieve was a wider 
security for those ill-placed to benefit from it, a point often recognised and voiced by 
contemporaries who complained of the excessive pressures which groups such as merchants 
and corn-mongers brought to bear upon markets to the severe detriment of those without the 
resources to compete.
50
 Government attempts to regulate the market in the early fourteenth 
century, and to ease access to foodstuffs for those with less money to pay, also typically came 
to nothing, with price-controlling mechanisms soon abandoned as largely unworkable and the 
market allowed to run.
51
 In this respect, Mark Bailey is certainly correct to identify the early 
fourteenth-century market as ‘imperfectly developed’.52 
The continuity of marketing structures, suggested by the information presented above, 
also indicates that any adjustment of the market in the crisis period may have served to 
reinforce at least some of its operations. Recently, Robert Braid has argued that the extremely 
difficult conditions of the Great Famine may have also encouraged frugality and a heightened 
regard for the importance of work and capital accumulation amongst survivors, including 
some suggestion of improved output generated by greater labour input.
53
 Amongst the 
relatively well-off, whether a view as to what constituted business efficacy and appropriate 
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modes of dealing was also adjusted in this period, and perhaps even sharpened, may be 
difficult to gauge with any degree of accuracy, though further research into, amongst other 
approaches, litigation for the recovery of debt and contemporary comment, including 
‘political’ poems and songs may offer insight.54 We can though be reasonably certain that the 
early fourteenth-century economy underwent considerable strain and adjustment.  From this 
period of crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the economy emerged leaner with capital 
redistributed to those with a more aggressive and competitive instinct or at least with the 
kinds of resources which allowed them to reinforce their position in the economy. That there 
was such an uneven distribution of capital and that some sections of society enjoyed effective 
surpluses is both evident in the kinds of activities outlined above but is also clear from other 
available sources for the period. Thus, for instance, taxation data suggests strongly that there 
remained an available surplus of capital throughout the worst years of the Great Famine and 
that this surplus was capable of being redeployed; Mark Ormrod has described the persistent 
high yields from government taxation upon moveables in the later thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries, including effective tax-gathering campaigns in the period of the Great 
Famine.
55
 Strong evidence for a rise in crime and especially theft of foodstuffs in the second 
decade of the fourteenth century also speaks to the existence of surplus and of an uneven 
distribution of capital and resources ill-suited to meet the needs of the population at large.
56
 
While such a redistribution, which obviously predated the famine but was not constrained or 
reduced by it, may very well have been disastrous for sections of the population and have 
added significantly to the suffering of those with lesser ‘entitlements’ and a weaker hold upon 
the market, the likelihood that the market itself failed in this period seems slight. Instead, it 
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may, ultimately, have emerged as a stronger entity and one capable of maintaining the kind of 
relative buoyancy of the economy identified at the outset of this discussion.
57
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